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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 5, 1991, after consulting federal financial regulatory
agencies and other interested governmental parties,' the Department of
the Treasury transmitted to Congress its report: Modernizing the Finan-
cial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks." 2
The Treasury Report concludes that four major problems confront the
U.S. banking system:
(1) reduced bank competitiveness and financial strength, caused by out-
dated legal restrictions that prevent banks from responding to changing fi-
nancial markets and technology; (2) the overextension of deposit insurance,
resulting in excessive exposure for taxpayers and weakened market disci-
pline for banks; (3) a fragmented regulatory system that has created dupli-
cative rules and has often failed to produce decisive remedial action; and (4)
an undercapitalized deposit insurance fund. 3
To address these problems, the Treasury Report recommends four
fundamental legislative reforms: (1) to increase bank competitiveness,
Congress should authorize nation-wide banking, new financial activities
for banks, and commercial ownership of banks; (2) to reduce taxpayer
exposure and increase market discipline, Congress should reduce the
scope of deposit insurance, require a link between regulatory supervision
and capital strength, and require risk-based insurance premiums for de-
posit insurance; (3) to reduce duplicative rules and produce decisive re-
medial action, Congress should streamline the federal regulatory system;
and (4) to recapitalize the Bank Insurance Fund, Congress should adopt
a funding plan based on contributions from the banking industry, rather
than from the Treasury and the taxpayers.4
Since its release, the Treasury Report has received substantial atten-
1. The agencies included the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Reserve Board
(Federal Reserve), the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration, the Office of Management and Budget, the
Council of Economic Advisors, and the Office of Policy Development within the Executive Office of
the President.
2. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR SAFER MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991) [hereinafter Treasury Report]. Congress
directed the preparation of such a report in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1001, 103 Stat. 183.
3. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at ix (emphasis in original).




tion from both the banking industry and Congress. While some of the
report's recommendations have sparked considerable differences of opin-
ion, representatives of the federal financial regulatory agencies have sup-
ported most of the proposals. In addition, most major financial
institutions and many large nonfinancial firms have voiced support for
the reforms. However, there has been significant opposition to many of
the Treasury proposals from consumer organizations and from small,
state, and foreign banks.
The current Treasury proposals are much like the sweeping banking
industry reforms of the past in their attempt to correct the failures of past
legislation. Like previous attempts at comprehensive reform, they are
unlikely to accomplish all that the drafters hope. The proposed legisla-
tion should help restore bank competitiveness, reduce overextended in-
surance coverage, streamline the regulatory system, and recapitalize the
Bank Insurance Fund with industry funding. However, many of the
Treasury proposals do not go far enough, providing only minimal guid-
ance and leaving the difficult details of implementation to the federal fi-
nancial regulatory agencies. Numerous unaddressed issues may render
many of the Treasury's recommendations less beneficial in practice than
in theory.
Much has been written about the portions of the Treasury Report that
recommend the expansion of bank powers to engage in non-banking ac-
tivities. Most of the public debate has focused on the theoretical merits
of the proposals to abolish restrictions on interstate banking, to repeal
restrictions on securities underwriting by banks, and to allow ownership
of banking institutions by industrial concerns. However, there has been
little analysis of the proposals to correct past abuses and to impose new
safeguards-such as increased capital requirements-as prerequisites to
the use of the proposed expanded powers. After a very basic historical
review of past attempts to "reform" the banking industry, this Article
focuses on the less publicized portions of the Treasury recommendations
in an attempt to identify some of the issues that would remain unsettled,
even if the proposals are enacted into law.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As the Treasury Report points out, the current problems of the deposit
insurance system were predictable, and in fact, were predicted by critics
1991]
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of the proposed deposit insurance legislation of the 1930s.1 The Treasury
Report thus raises the question of whether some of the present problems
could have been avoided if Congress had listened more carefully to the
critics of the 1930s. More fundamentally, it raises the question of the
lasting effectiveness of any legislative solution.
The Treasury Report covers much more than just deposit insurance
reform. If enacted, the recommendations would join a handful of legisla-
tive efforts that significantly changed the federal government's regulation
of the banking industry. In general, Congress intended that each of these
"reform" efforts correct the problems resulting from past "reforms."
While the current recommendations are being promoted as "financial
services modernization," it appears in large part that the Treasury pro-
posals would dismantle legislative "reforms" of the past. The proposals
would take the banking industry back to a less regulated age, removing
many of the flat prohibitions of existing law and substituting less intru-
sive regulatory safeguards. While the Treasury Report's review of the
history of the deposit insurance system is helpful, a broader view of the
federal bank regulatory system's development puts the Treasury recom-
mendations in better perspective, illustrating certain principles common
in life, as well as in legislation. First, when problems are left unad-
dressed, they get worse. Second, no matter how comprehensive the ef-
forts to solve past problems, it is impossible to anticipate future
developments.
A. The National Bank Act of 1864 6
Historians often refer to the years 1836-1863 as the "free-banking pe-
riod"'7 or "the heyday of state banking."8 While some banks operated
under state control, others operated free of regulation. The widespread
circulation of state currencies, counterfeit notes, and notes from non-ex-
istent banks was a significant problem,9 ultimately resulting in an ineffi-
5. Id. at 5 ("Events have thus demonstrated that the criticisms leveled in the 1930s against the
idea of federal deposit insurance had considerable merit").
6. National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. (1988)). A major source for portions of the historical overview in Parts IIA through D
was an unpublished monograph entitled "Overview of Bank Regulation" dated March 1989,
prepared by Mark D. Morris and William F. Stutts, Jr. with Baker & Botts, Austin, Texas.
7. J. NORTON & S. WHITLEY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 2.03[2] (1991).
8. R. WEsT, BANKING REFORM AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 1863-1923, at 15 (1977).
9. D. LUCKETr, MONEY AND BANKING 291 (1984). See also R. WEST, supra note 8, at 17-18
("[Transportation difficulties and lack of information afforded ample opportunity for unscrupulous
operators to turn a quick profit by circulating unbacked currency").
[Vol. 69:809
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cient and unreliable currency system. By 1860, approximately 10,000
different types of bank notes, with multiple values, were circulating.10 By
1861, the value of worthless bank notes amounted to an estimated $100
million.'1
In 1864, Congress enacted the National Bank Act to remedy the
abuses of the unregulated banking industry and to correct the "near an-
archy of the currency supply."' 2 The National Bank Act and its amend-
ments incorporated four major reforms. First, it established a system for
chartering national banks, under the supervision of the Comptroller of
the Currency.13 Second, to increase the level of supervision of banking
institutions, it established examination standards, higher capital and re-
serve requirements, 4 and extensive conditions on loans. 5 Third, it es-
tablished a unified currency, offered only by national banks. 6 Finally, it
required national banks to issue notes only to the extent that notes were
guaranteed by the federal government.1 7 Thus, "elaborate precautions
were taken to ensure the integrity of national bank notes." '
B. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 1
Notwithstanding the reforms enacted in the National Bank Act, the
national banking system suffered from shortcomings. Because the same
currency could be used to support deposits at different institutions, banks
10. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, FINANCIAL REFORM IN THE 1980s 29-30 (1985).
11. B. KLEBANER, AMERICAN COMMERCIAL BANKING, A HISTORY 51 (1990). The Chicago
Tribune, on March 24, 1863, described the notes as follows:
Torn, greasy, issued by nobody knows whom, payable - if payable at all - in other scraps
of printed paper, like those on demand, not I in 5 of which is as good as the notes for an
equal amount of any solvent business man; yet all clothed by custom and prescription with
the attribute of money.
NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION, THE ORIGIN OF THE NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM, S. Doc.
No. 582, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1910).
12. D. LUCKETr, supra note 9, at 291.
13. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 30.
14. D. LUCKErr, supra note 9, at 295.
15. The Act prohibited loans on a bank's own stock, limited loans to one borrower, and placed
a ceiling on interest rates for loans. National Bank Act §§ 29, 30, 35, 12 U.S.C. §§ 83, 84, 85, 86, 94
(1988)
16. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 30. See National Bank Act § 22.
17. For every $100 of notes issued, $90 in federal government bonds had to be deposited with
the Comptroller of the Currency. National Bank Act § 21. The upper limit on the amount of notes
issuable was the bank's paid-in capital. Id. at § 13.
18. D. LUCKETT, supra note 9, at 292.
19. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 25 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C. (1988)).
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were able to inflate, or "pyramid," the value of their reserves artifi-
cially.20 Also, because the National Bank Act did not provide for a na-
tion-wide check-clearing system, checks had to pass through a complex
system of correspondent banks.2" The National Bank Act also failed to
provide a system to vary the amount of notes in circulation based on
cyclical and seasonal fluctuations in need.22 Finally, because the system
afforded no method for expanding total bank reserves during periods of
crisis, the availability of funds was severely limited and subject to strin-
gent credit policies.2"
A series of financial panics after 1864 illustrated the inadequacies of
the original national bank system.24 After major panics in 1873 and
1893, depositors, increasingly skeptical that banks could satisfy demands
for payment during emergencies, came to expect that many banks would
fail or suspend operations during such periods. The succession of finan-
cial panics was attributed to the lack of a centralized reserve and policy
making authority.2 Depositors' growing distrust of the system led to
calls for a new national currency, secured by the assets of issuing
banks.26 During the panic of 1907, as a result of pressure from J.P. Mor-
gan, New York banks voluntarily pooled their reserves.27 Although the
measure demonstrated the benefits of pooling reserves, it also showed the
extreme reluctance of banks to engage in such efforts voluntarily, and
demonstrated the growing need for a federal regulatory authority. Some
critics, however, still opposed the creation of a central bank, arguing that
government involvement either would bring politics to banking-leading
ultimately to complete governmental control-or would bring banking to
politics through "Wall Street domination."28
Congress established a National Monetary Commission to study the
deficiencies in the banking system and to make suggestions on how best
20. D. LucKETr, supra note 9, at 291.
21. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 31.
22. D. LUCKETr, supra note 9, at 296.
23. Id.
24. The inability of the banking system to satisfy increased customer demand during holiday
and crop-moving seasons contributed to the more notable panics. In New York, for example, panics
broke out after currency had been sent west to pay farmers for their crops. H. BARGER, MONEY,
BANKING AND PUBLIC POLICY 142-43 (1962).
25. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 31.
26. R. WEsT, supra note 8, at 27-28, 36.
27. Id. at 32.




to achieve a more stable financial and monetary framework.2 9 The Com-
mission, comprised of seven House members and seven Senate members,
hired experts and conducted hearings.3 ° After comparing American and
foreign banking systems, the commission cited the "concentration of sur-
plus money and available funds" in New York City as one of the major
defects in the existing system 31 and recommended that the United States
create a central bank similar to the Bank of England.32
The Commission's recommendations largely were adopted in the Fed-
eral Reserve Act of 1913. The Act established a centralized banking sys-
tem designed:
to give stability to U.S. commerce and industry;
to prevent financial panics or stringencies;
to make available effective commercial credits recommended for individuals
engaged in manufacturing, commerce, finance, and business; and
to put an end to the pyramiding of bank reserves and the use of such
reserves for gambling purposes on the stock exchange. 33
To allay fears that the federal government was seizing control of the
banking industry, Congress decentralized the system, establishing twelve
separate districts, each with its own reserve bank.3 " The Federal Reserve
Board was created to serve as the administrative head of the system. The
Act provided that private member banks would own the central bank
through the purchase of Federal Reserve stock.35 National banks were
required to join the Federal Reserve System or forego their national
charters. State bank membership was optional.
The federal reserve banks also were expected to serve as "lenders of
last resort," allowing member banks to borrow reserves during a panic if
they had appropriate short-term collateral.36 This function was viewed
29. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 31.
30. H. BARGER, supra note 24, at 149.
31. B. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 81-82.
32. H. BARGER, supra note 24, at 149.
33. B. KLEBANER, supra note 11, at 111. The creation of a central monetary authority also
marked the recognition of the relationship between the structure of the financial system and mone-
tary control, accomplishing monetary control functions in a more automatic fashion through the
rules of the gold standard and eligibility requirements for discounting commercial paper. T. CAR-
GILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 32-33. See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, § 13, 38 Stat. 251, 264
(1913), repealed by Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 96 Stat. 1510 (codified at
12 U.S.C.A. § 82 (West 1989)).
34. Federal Reserve Act, ch 6, § 2, 38 Stat. 251, 251 (1913) (codified as amended at 12
U S.C.A. § 222 (West 1989)).
35. Id. at §§ 2, 9, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 222, 321-336, 338 (West 1989).
36. Id. at § 16, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 248, 360, 411-416, 418-421, 467 (West 1989).
1991]
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as important in achieving stability during times of financial crisis.3 7
C. The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 8
The Federal Reserve Act did not result in the financial stability for
which its supporters had hoped. Bank failures continued at a high level,
averaging 600 per year.39 One of the major flaws of the Federal Reserve
Act was its failure to regulate the state banking system.4° Because state
banks were subject only to state regulations, the Act encouraged banks to
seek state charters and thus avoid federal regulation by the Federal Re-
serve Board.41
More than 5,700 banks failed between 1921 and 1929.42 In December
1930, the Comptroller of the Currency found that those failures had tied
up deposits of nearly $2 billion.43 Critics blamed the Federal Reserve
System for failing to check speculative bank investments during the
1920s. Banks were willing to pay high interest rates to attract deposits to
invest in high-risk loans and securities ventures. The system also had
structural defects. In 1931, the Secretary of the Treasury stated:
Our dual system and the divided control which exists have tended to relaxa-
tion in banking laws and regulations, and to the development of unsound
practices in the management of the banks. Moreover, recent events have
disclosed as never before the extent to which many banks with deposits
payable on demand have allowed too large a proportion of their assets to
become tied up directly or indirectly in capital commitments .... The
banking structure of the United States needs modification.44
Despite general recognition of the need for reforms, the banking com-
munity resisted any increase in federal control. State banking authorities
also opposed further infringement on their powers.45 Substantial reform
from within the banking industry was itself difficult due to the varying
37. D. FISHER, MONEY, BANKING, AND MONETARY POLICY 44-45 (1980).
38. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1987)); Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614,49 Stat. 684 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (1987)) [hereinafter Banking Acts].
39. D. LUCKETr, supra note 9, at 298.
40. K. COOPER & D. FRASER, BANKING DEREGULATION AND THE NEW COMPETITION IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES 49 (1984).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 50. The majority of the failed institutions were state banks in rural areas.
43. H. BURNS, THE AMERICAN BANKING COMMUNITY AND NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS
1933-1935, at 10 (1974).
44. Id. (citing U.S. SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1931)).




interests of national and state banks, urban and rural banks, East Coast
and inland banks, and large and small banks. Legislation was necessary,
not only to restore public confidence, but also to reconcile competing
interests.4
6
The Banking Acts, adopted to address the major defects of prior law,
established an extensive network of regulation to be implemented by new
federal agencies.4' To limit competition for deposits and, indirectly, to
curb speculative lending and investment, the Banking Acts prohibited
interest payments on demand deposits and gave the Federal Reserve au-
thority to regulate interest paid on time deposits. 48  In addition, the
Banking Acts limited competition by establishing regulatory barriers to
entry into the industry. Before allowing a new bank to enter the market,
regulatory agencies were required to review the need for additional bank-
ing services and to determine whether the existing banks and new banks
could both earn adequate rates of return. In stark contrast to the days of
"free banking," banking became a protected industry. A primary goal of
federal law was to ensure the survival of existing banks.
The most significant reform, in terms of restoring public confidence,
was the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).4 9 Congress created the FDIC to provide federal insurance for
banks and mutual savings banks.' Additional functions included the
purchase, holding, and liquidation of the assets of closed national and
member state banks.5" Deposit insurance substantially reduced the like-
lihood that one institution's failure would generate runs on banks and
panics that historically had been a major problem.52
46. Id. at 7.
47. After adoption of the legislation, the federal regulatory apparatus consisted of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, the Federal Bureau of Credit
Unions, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Reserve.
48. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 181, 182 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A.
§§ 371a, 371b (West 1989)).
49. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 35. See Banking Act of 1933 § 8 (amending
the Federal Reserve Act by inserting §§ 12A and 12B).
50. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (replaced by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act, ch. 967, § 2[1], 64 Stat. 873 (1950) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West
1989)).
51. Id.
52. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 35.
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D. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 53
During the early 1900s, the practice of forming a bank holding com-
pany to control the stock of one or more banks along with other types of
businesses became popular.54 The Federal Reserve reported that, by
1930, holding companies controlled 2,103 banks, with the value of loans
and investments totalling $11 billion, or 19 percent of the assets of all
United States banks.55 The state and federal governments criticized the
"uncontrolled growth" of bank holding companies. At least one bill to
restrict holding companies was introduced in each session of Congress
between 1933 and 1955.56 A subcommittee of the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee that investigated the non-banking activities of hold-
mng companies in connection with the stock market crash of 1929, found
that the involvement of bank holding companies in the securities business
played a major role in the uncontrolled speculation of the 1920s.57
With the Banking Act of 1933, Congress took an important first step
toward controlling bank holding companies by prohibiting them from
engaging in the securities business and by authorizing limited regulation
by the Federal Reserve Board.5" However, holding companies continued
to escape regulation of their non-banking, non-securities activities.59 In
1956, William M. Martin, Jr., Chairman of the Federal Reserve, ex-
plained that the Banking Act of 1933 had "proved entirely inadequate to
deal with the special problems presented by bank holding companies."' 6
Bank holding companies that combined banking and non-banking activi-
ties presented one of the main areas of potential abuse. Chairman Martin
emphasized that a bank holding company's use of depositors' money to
invest in its affiliated enterprises jeopardized the fiduciary relationship
between a bank and its depositors.61
53. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-48 (1988)).
54. T. CARGILL & G. GARCIA, supra note 10, at 36-37.
55. See M. JESSE & S. SEELIG, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE PUBLIC INTERESTS
(1977). Other data indicated that, at this time, 28 large holding companies, although controlling
only 2% of commercial banks, controlled almost 10% of total bank assets.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat. 162 (current version at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1843
(West 1989)).
59. M. JESSE & S. SEELIG, supra note 55, at 8.
60. S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2482, 2483.




In response to these problems, Congress enacted the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956. The Act served to:
define bank holding companies;
control expansion;
require divestment of bank holding companies' non-banking interests; and
establish the Federal Reserve Board's administrative responsibilities and
enforcement powers.6 2
Under the Bank Holding Company Act, a company becomes a bank
holding company when it directly or indirectly acquires control of a bank
or bank holding company.63
Each holding company is required to register with the Federal Re-
serve. 6" The Bank Holding Company Act also requires that bank hold-
ing companies obtain approval from the Federal Reserve Board before
acquiring more than five percent of the voting shares of another bank,
forming a new holding company, acquiring all or substantially all of the
assets of a bank (if the holding company was not a bank), or merging or
consolidating with another bank holding company.65 The Bank Holding
Company Act requires that, before approving any acquisition, merger, or
consolidation, the Federal Reserve Board consider several factors:
the financial and managerial history and conditions;
the future prospects of the company and the banks;
the convenience, needs, and welfare of the affected community; and
whether the effect of an acquisition, consolidation or merger would...
expand the size or extent of the bank holding company system involved
beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound banking, the public inter-
est, and the preservation of competition in the field of banking.66
Thus, in general, the Bank Holding Company Act filled a major gap in
prior legislation by preventing the holding company structure from being
used to undermine the safety and soundness of federally insured banks.
E. Summary
Over the past 130 years, the role of the federal government in the regu-
62. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988).
63. A company gains "control" if it controls or has the power to vote 25% or more of another's
voting securities, or if the Federal Reserve Board finds that the company exercises a controlling
influence over another bank or bank holding company's management and policy. Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 2, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1841(a)(2)(4), (c) (West 1989)).
64. Id. at § 5(a), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1844 (West 1989).
65. Id.
66. See id. at § 3(c), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1842 (West 1989).
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lation of banking steadily has increased. Congress has adopted succes-
sive reform measures to correct the abuses and structural defects that
arose after the prior round of reform because the reforms were unable
completely to cure the problems they were intended to fix. In each case,
although Congress intended the legislation as a comprehensive reform
program, the new laws ultimately proved inadequate. The history of leg-
islative attempts to regulate the banking industry indicates that legisla-
tive "fixes" are, at best, temporary. Ultimately, Congress' best laid plans
are rendered obsolete by economic changes or by the ingenuity of bank-
ers and their advisors in finding loopholes in the law.
The current Treasury recommendations include significant measures
aimed at curbing abuses of the past. In addition, they revise, and actu-
ally dismantle, parts of the regulatory system that developed from the
Banking Acts. In particular, the "financial services modernization" rec-
ommendations directly reverse many earlier reforms, by repealing re-
strictions on securities activities, allowing acquisition of banks by
industrial concerns, and reducing federal scrutiny of well-capitalized
banks. Further, the Treasury's recommendation that banks be super-
vised by a single federal regulator (within the Treasury Department), re-
scinds the powers granted to other bank regulatory agencies by the
Banking Acts. Thus, many of the Treasury's major proposals to modern-
ize the industry simply restore powers taken away by the Banking Acts
in the 1930s. The banking industry's record concerning self-regulation
seems to indicate that any grant of new bank powers should be supple-
mented by carefully considered regulatory boundaries.
III. THE TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Proposals Relating To "Deposit Insurance"
While the Treasury proposals to grant new powers to banks have
drawn the most attention, the Treasury recommendations for "deposit
insurance reform" ultimately could have a more significant impact on a
larger segment of the banking industry. These proposals would do much
more than simply change the rules regarding deposit insurance coverage;
they also include a number of provisions aimed directly at correcting
recent abuses of the system.
A major theoretical foundation for the Treasury's deposit insurance
proposals is that the existing system reduces "market discipline" by elim-




institution in which they place their money.67 As the Treasury Report
explains:
Events have thus demonstrated that some of the criticisms leveled in the
1930s against the idea of federal deposit insurance had considerable merit.
The system has subsidized highly risky, poorly managed institutions. These
institutions have exploited the federal safety net by funding speculative
projects with insured deposits. The resulting costs have been borne by well-
run institutions and by the taxpayers.68
To some extent, however, the "market discipline" problem inheres in
the concept of deposit insurance. One of the primary purposes of the
insurance system, to promote confidence in the safety of insured depos-
its,69 necessarily will conflict with the goal of instilling "market disci-
pline" on financial institution management. The "market discipline"
problem either can be reduced or aggravated by particular policy choices,
but it can never be eliminated.7 ° The Treasury Report, in an attempt to
find an appropriate middle ground, combines increased market-based in-
centives with new regulatory prohibitions and requirements.
The deposit insurance debate has focused primarily on the issues of
who should be insured, and for how much. The Treasury proposal
would maintain the current $100,000 limit on deposit insurance cover-
age, but impose that limit on the aggregate accounts held per institution
by each depositor.71 The implicit assumption of that limitation is that
large uninsured depositors will impose the necessary "market discipline"
because of their strong incentive to inquire as to the financial health of an
institution before depositing their money. However, this same basic pre-
sumption has provided the theoretical foundation for the deposit insur-
ance system since 1933. Experience has shown that the theory does not
work perfectly because, as a matter of policy, the FDIC often protects
even uninsured depositors in a failed institution.72 Thus, tightening the
dollar limitations on insurance coverage alone will not solve the deposit
insurance problems.
FDIC policy aside, many of the recently apparent flaws in the theory
of deposit insurance are also attributable to the ingenuity of large deposi-
tors who have found ways around the system. The Treasury Report
67. See, eg., Treasury Report, supra note 2, at I-1l to 1-13.
68. Id. at I-1l.
69. Id. at 1-4 to I-11.
70. See id. at 111-2 to 111-10.
71. Id. at 20.
72. Id. at 1-12, 111-2 to 111-10.
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therefore recommends ending or limiting some of the means by which
large depositors have obtained deposit insurance protection in the past.73
These recommendations bring to mind the military adage about making
war plans for the future based on the tactics and strategy of the last war.
While the Treasury Report addresses the current "abuses" of the system,
innovative investors and money managers undoubtedly will devise new
and different means of taking advantage of the government's safety net
without imposing the desired "market discipline" on financial
institutions.
Whether or not the Treasury recommendations have a lasting effect,
they will have a significant impact on the way many banks do business.
Some of the major proposals, and their potential effects, are outlined
below.
1. Brokered Deposits
One of the more controversial proposals, which would have a substan-
tial impact on money managers and large investors, is the Treasury's rec-
ommendation to eliminate insurance coverage for "brokered deposits."'74
As the name implies, "brokered deposits" are deposits placed with a fi-
nancial institution by a third party, or broker. Brokered deposits became
popular after the deregulation of deposit interest rates in 1980. Through
a broker, large depositors could get the benefit of the highest interest
rates offered by financial institutions located throughout the country.
The inherent problem, however, is that the financial institutions paying
the highest interest rates are often those in the worst firtancial condition.
Additionally, deposit brokers typically "package" the deposits in
amounts of $100,000 or less to take advantage of federal deposit insur-
ance.75 While the results of empirical studies of the relationship between
brokered deposits and institutional failures are debatable, there is no
question that many savings and loan associations that failed during the
1980s fueled explosive growth with brokered deposits. 76
The Treasury Report suggests removing brokered deposits from the
definition of insured deposits.77 In addition to the Treasury's goal of re-
ducing the potential liabilities of the insurance funds, the Treasury rec-
73. See id., Conclusions and Recommendations, at 22-29.
74. See id., Conclusions and Recommendations, at 24.
75. See generally id. at IV-1 to IV-2.





ommendation would have other significant effects. First, it would
substantially decrease the business of deposit brokers. Second, it could
also affect the behavior of financial institutions, limiting their deposit-
gathering abilities and making rapid growth much more difficult. In ad-
dition, by reducing the attractiveness of brokered deposits, the Treasury
recommendation might reduce the incentive for significant regional dif-
ferences in interest rates. Finally, by slowing the flow of funds into finan-
cial institutions that pay higher rates, the Treasury proposal would
reduce the funds available for highly speculative investments. While
none of these consequences is stated in the Treasury Report, they all
appear to be among the unspoken objectives of the brokered deposit
recommendations.
2. Interest Rate Limitations
As a supplement to the proposals relating to brokered deposits, the
Treasury Report discusses limitations on allowable interest rates.78
Although the Treasury Report did not include such limitations as a spe-
cific recommendation, the Treasury's proposed legislation to implement
the Report does provide for interest rate limitations.79 Section 102 of
FISCCA, introduced as H.R. 150580 and S. 713,81 would preclude insti-
tutions that do not meet minimum capital requirements from soliciting
deposits "by offering rates of interest ... which are significantly higher
than the prevailing rates of interest on deposits offered by other insured
depository institutions in such institution's normal market area."' 82 The
provision is intended to limit the ability of an institution to "grow out" of
its problems by inflating its deposit base through high rates of interest.
This pattern of explosive growth through above-market interest rates was
common to many of the most spectacular savings and loan failures of the
1980s.1a The legislative language, however, is silent on when the rates
being offered are "significantly higher" than those offered by other insti-
tutions in the same area. While it is certainly possible to calculate aver-
78. See id. at IV-9.
79. The proposed legislation drafted by the Treasury is entitled the "Financial Institutions
Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991" (FISCCA).
80. H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
81. S. 713, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
82. FISCCA § 102(a).
83. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT To CONGRESS, THRIFT FAILURES:
COSTLY FAILURES RESULTED FROM REGULATORY VIOLATIONS AND UNSAFE PRACTICES 25-26
(1989).
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age rates and to issue regulations defining what will be considered a
"significant" difference, the proposed legislation leaves unanswered some
interesting questions.
If enacted, FISCCA could result in even more uniformity in interest
rates than currently exists because insured institutions will have a statu-
tory justification for keeping interest rates on deposits low. The new pro-
vision could solve the problem of competition for funds that results in the
federal government insuring accounts that pay rates of interest signifi-
cantly above what the government pays for borrowing. 4 However, it
would also impose a new form of indirect federal regulation of interest
rates, thereby swinging the pendulum back from the deregulation of in-
terest rates that occurred in 1980.85 Instead of statutorily setting deposit
interest rates, the new law effectively would allow depository institutions
to establish such rates by tacit agreement, thus raising questions about
the interplay between the proposed statute and the federal antitrust laws.
Theoretically, it is possible that the proposed statute could force a
downward movement in deposit interest rates. For example, when an
institution wants to decrease its deposit base to meet statutory capital
requirements, it may post lower interest rates to discourage deposits.
These lower rates could cause average rates to drop, and could thereby
force other institutions paying higher than average rates to come into
line. These decreases in rates could, in turn, lower the average, again
forcing more institutions to lower their rates. Ultimately, the downward
spiral would end only when all institutions were clustered around the
average rate for the particular market area. Thus, while the deposit so-
licitation provision is a useful attempt to deal with one of the significant
problems of the 1980s, there may be a number of consequences that need
to be thoroughly investigated before specific language is adopted.
3. "Too Big To Fail"
The Treasury Report also addresses the problems associated with the
FDIC's "too big to fail" policy.86 The proposed solution simply removes
the "too big to fail" determination from the FDIC's jurisdiction and pro-
vides that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury will make the determi-
nation whether the proposed resolution of a failed financial institution
84. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at IV-9.
85. See generally Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 204, 94 Stat. 143 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1987)).




would have a severe adverse impact upon the financial system.8 7
Interestingly, the relatively modest jurisdictional change recom-
mended in the Treasury Report would not take effect until three years
after the date of enactment. Presumably, this three year time delay indi-
cates that the Treasury and the Federal Reserve are likely to take a fun-
damentally different approach to the "too big to fail" question; large
depositors should no longer assume they will be protected. The time de-
lay would thus allow large depositors and bank creditors to evaluate the
strength of their depository institutions and to move funds from weak
institutions to strong institutions. While the reaction of large depositors
and creditors is uncertain, the prospect of a loss upon the failure of a
weak institution might impose the kind of "market discipline" that the
Treasury favors.
Another issue, of course, is the effect a substantial dose of "market
discipline" will have on the FDIC insurance funds. Significant growth of
strong institutions could result from the increased market discipline due
to an inflow of new deposits. Similarly, weak institutions could shrink
substantially as a result of the corresponding outflow of deposits. This
result certainly would benefit the insurance funds, since it reduces the
potential exposure of the funds upon failure of the weaker institution.
An additional consideration, however, is the effect on trade creditors and
others who do business with weak financial institutions. Faced with the
failure of a weak institution and the prospect of substantial losses, credi-
tors may demand security before providing goods and services, or may
refuse to do business with weak institutions altogether. Such effects
could further hasten the decline of a weak institution and eliminate any
possibile recovery, thus exacerbating the burden on the insurance funds.
Finally, a more stringent application of the "too big to fail" policy will
have little effect on "market discipline" unless large depositors and credi-
tors can obtain accurate information about the health of the financial
institutions with which they deal. Presently, even where the financial
institution is a publicly traded company, the book value of its assets dif-
fers from the market value of those assets. An accurate picture of the
institution's financial health is therefore difficult to obtain. Unless accu-
rate disclosure of complete financial information is required, the "market
discipline" goal of the "too big to fail" recommendations will be difficult
to achieve.
87. Id., Conclusions and Recommendations, at 27-28.
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4. Risk-Based Assessments
The Treasury Report also recommends that the FDIC develop a sys-
tem of risk-based premiums for deposit insurance.88 The Treasury pro-
posal would allow the FDIC broad discretion in determining the factors
that should be considered in evaluating a particular institution's risk and
in setting the corresponding premium. However, the current law regard-
ing the assessment of insurance premiums contains detailed provisions
and includes maximum premium levels.89 FISCCA would not change
these maximum premium levels.90 It thus appears that the Treasury's
proposed "risk-based" system would give the FDIC the authority to ad-
just premiums downward for low-risk institutions, but would not provide
corresponding authority to increase premiums above the current ceilings
for high-risk institutions. Unless the FDIC is authorized to raise the pre-
mium ceiling for risky institutions, the Treasury proposal could be the
equivalent of a reduction in taxes without a corresponding reduction in
spending.
5. Restrictions On Federally Insured State Bank Activities
In its recommendations regarding limitations on the activities of state-
chartered banks, the Treasury Report attempts to address another signifi-
cant problem that has existed since the days of the National Bank Act.
Under the "dual banking system" in the United States, a financial institu-
tion may be chartered under either federal or state law and regulated by
either federal or state regulators, or by both. During the 1980s, some
states, competing with one another to attract new financial institutions,
allowed state-chartered institutions to engage in a much broader range of
activities than those permissible for federally chartered institutions.91
While the dual banking system and the right of the states to set stan-
dards for state-chartered institutions are deeply entrenched, federally in-
sured, state-chartered institutions pose a risk to the federal treasury. The
Treasury Report, therefore, recommends that the risk to the federal in-
surance funds be lessened by limiting the range of permissible activities
for state-chartered, federally insured institutions to the same activities
authorized for federally chartered institutions, notwithstanding any more
88. Id., Conclusions and Recommendation, at 32-36.
89. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (1988).
90. FISCCA § 104.




liberal provisions of state law.92
The thrust of the proposal, as set forth in the Treasury's proposed leg-
islation, is that state banks, and their subsidiaries, would be prohibited
from engaging in any activity not permissible for national banks or their
subsidiaries. Only after an express finding that the activity "would pose
no significant risk to the affected deposit insurance fund" would the
FDIC permit the activity.93 In addition, the state bank would be re-
quired to comply with the minimum capital standards imposed by the
bank regulatory agencies.94
While paying lip service to the concept of the dual banking system, the
proposed legislation would make it very difficult for state regulators to
allow state-chartered institutions to make investments or to engage in
activities beyond those available to federally chartered institutions. Any
incentive for an institution to subject itself to dual regulation by choosing
to be state-chartered rather than federally chartered thus would be
greatly reduced. Long-term effects of the proposal may be the gradual
disappearance of state-chartered institutions, and the concurrent wither-
ing of the dual banking system.
6. Market Value And Other Disclosure
To provide a means for investors, depositors, creditors, and others to
obtain a more accurate picture of the strength or weakness of a financial
institution, the Treasury Report recommends that a means be developed
for reporting the fair market value of assets and liabilities in financial
statements and reports filed with the bank regulatory agencies and the
SEC.95 The Treasury's proposed legislation would require insured insti-
tutions to provide copies of their financial reports to the bank regulatory
agencies, to notify the regulators within fifteen days of the resignation or
dismissal of their accountants, and to provide a statement of reasons for
the change.96 Although the proposed legislation would not change the
accounting standards by which the capital of an insured institution is
formally determined, it ultimately would require a uniform system of
market value reporting useful not only to investors, depositors, and cred-
itors, but also to the bank regulators.
92. Id. at 48.
93. FISCCA § 105.
94. Id.
95. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 43-44.
96. FISCCA § 107.
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The general subject of market value accounting and disclosure, de-
bated in considerable detail, is a primary concern of the SEC.97 By fo-
cusing only on market value disclosure as a supplement to existing
accounting disclosure requirements, the Treasury Report does not at-
tempt to resolve the theoretical debate on market value accounting. This
approach may be sufficient to accomplish the goal of improving market
discipline, but it is unclear whether it will satisfy the needs of the finan-
cial institution regulatory agencies.
B. Proposals Relating To Financial Services Modernization
The Treasury recommendations for "modernizing" the financial serv-
ices industry contain four key components. First, the current bank hold-
ing company structure and the separation of banking and commerce
would be replaced with a structure under which a non-financial commer-
cial firm, a "diversified holding company," could own, in addition to any
other subsidiaries, a "financial services holding company." In turn, the
financial services holding company could own banks, securities firms,
and insurance companies.98 Second, national banks would be authorized
to engage directly in certain financial activities that are currently prohib-
ited and, under some circumstances, would be prohibited from engaging
in certain activities that are currently authorized.99 Third, national
banks would be allowed to branch into all states within three years, and
to branch within each state to the extent the state's law allows intrastate
branching for state-chartered banks."° Finally, the ability of diversified
commercial companies to own a financial services holding company that
in turn owns banks, the ability of national banks to engage in newly-
authorized non-banking activities, and the regulatory supervision of
banks in general, would be determined based upon the capital level of the
regulated bank.10 These four recommendations are discussed below.
97. See RTC Assets Disposition: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990); Testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission, before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (Septem-
ber 10, 1990).
98. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 56-61.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 49-53.




1. Financial Services Holding Companies and Diversified Holding
Companies
The key structural component of financial modernization in the Treas-
ury Report is the replacement of bank holding companies with financial
services holding companies ("FSHCs"). FSHCs would be authorized to
engage, through separate subsidiaries, in securities, insurance, and other
approved activities of a financial nature, provided that the bank main-
tains a minimum capital level. Rewarding well-capitalized banks with
the authority to engage in new financial activities through the FSHC
structure is designed to make the banking franchise more competitive
and profitable in order to attract needed capital. This in turn would min-
imize the exposure of the federal deposit insurance system and improve
the stability of the banking industry."°2 The insured bank would be regu-
lated by its primary bank regulator. 103 Any securities affiliate would be
regulated by the SEC, and any insurance affiliate would be regulated by
the relevant state insurance commission.
In addition to authorizing bank affiliation with financial services com-
panies, the Treasury Report would allow indirect ownership of banks by
commercial firms engaged in nonbanking businesses through such a
firm's ownership of a FSHC. Designated as "diversified holding compa-
nies" ("DHCs"), such firms are seen as a vital source of capital for the
banking industry. As the Treasury Report notes, "[b]anks need capital,
and commercial companies constitute almost 80 percent of the capital of
U.S. businesses." 104
The Treasury's proposal regarding FSHCs and DHCs is generally sup-
ported by regulators and industry as a way to make banks more competi-
tive through improved efficiency, and safer through diversification.
There are, however, four basic issues that the Treasury proposal has not
102. Id. at 55 ("This blending of banking, finance and commerce will a create stronger, more
diversified financial system that will provide important benefits to the consumer and important pro-
tections for the taxpayer").
103. Id. at 68. National banks and their holding companies would be regulated by the newly
created Federal Banking Agency within the Treasury Department. The Federal Reserve would reg-
ulate all state-chartered banks.
104. Id. at 57. This may be particularly true when the FDIC attempts to sell a failed institution,
leading to a substantial reduction in resolution costs. See Restructuring of the Banking Industry:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the
House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter
Hearings on Restructuring of the Banking Industry] (testimony of Philip J. Purcell, chairman and
Chief Executive Officer, Dean Witter Financial Services Group, Inc. on behalf of the Financial Serv-
ices Council at 21-22).
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addressed with certainty and that have raised objections.' First, no
matter how they are designed, "firewalls"' 6 will be either too high and
wide to allow synergies between entities, or so opaque that they will not
work when needed to balance properly the desire to obtain increased effi-
ciency through application of financial expertise and the conflicts of in-
terest that may lead to excessive risk-taking or self-dealing. Even though
the Treasury proposals would allow some "cross-selling" of bank, securi-
ties, and insurance products, capital flows and inter-affiliate financial ar-
rangements such as loans and guarantees would be heavily restricted.
For instance, a DHC would be able to own a securities affiliate within or
outside of a FSHC. If owned within, however, firewalls would apply.
Moreover, from three years after the enactment of FISCCA all securities
activities would be required to be conducted through an FSHC securities
subsidiary, or a subsidiary of the bank if no separate FSHC securities
subsidiary exists.
Enforcement of these firewalls would require substantial regulatory
oversight. For this reason, the American Bankers Association "opposes
firewalls that would impose heavy new regulatory burdens on the indus-
try and undermine the very purpose of allowing diversification through
the offering of additional financial services."' 7 Without such new regu-
latory standards, however, the Treasury's proposed safeguards against
conflicts of interest would be ineffective. The Independent Banking As-
sociation of America ("IBAA") has testified:
If the massive financial conglomerates that would be created are not permit-
ted to take advantage of the 'synergies' among their affiliates, why should
they be created in the first place? Either the firewalls will not work, and
consumers and businesses will be subject to abuses, or, they will work, and
the economic efficiency sought will not be attained.' 0 8
105. Oversight of the Financial Services Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommu.
nications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4
(1991) (Testimony of E. Gerald Corrigan, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
106. The term "firewalls," as used in the context of regulation of financial services, describes
various regulatory provisions designed to keep problems in one subsidiary or affiliate from affecting
the parent or affiliated company. For instance, the Treasury Report recommends that transfer of
funds between a federally insured bank and its holding company be prohibited to keep taxpayer
funds from going to the non-banking activity. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 59.
107. Hearings on Restructuring of the Banking Industry, supra note 104 (testimony of Richard
A. Kirk, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, United Bank of Denver, and President
of the American Bankers Association at 5).
108. Hearings on Restructuring of the Banking Industry, supra note 104 (testimony of David
BalIweg, President, Community State Bank, Union Grove, Wisconsin, and President of the In-




Moreover, the IBAA opposes the Treasury's plan to allow bank affiliates
to engage in underwriting and retail sales:
Rather than being independent agents, banks would likely sell products cre-
ated by their affiliates. They wouldn't ask themselves, what's best for my
customer, but what is our affiliate trying to sell today. Extensive consumer
protection firewalls would be needed to avoid conflicts of interest and pre-
vent abuses that the Treasury's new ownership structure could lead to....
We are deeply skeptical that any sort of workable firewalls could effectively
protect consumers. 10
9
Allowing affiliation of banks with nonbanking entities is also opposed
because at least parts of the banking supervisory system, and perhaps the
insurance fund as well, inevitably will be extended to such entities. As a
bank decreases its capital and descends into lower capital zones, its
FSHC and DHC, and their other subsidiaries, would become subject to
greater supervision and examination.
In addition, there is concern that the affiliation of banks with securities
or commercial firms will result in a harmful concentration of economic
resources and power. For instance, purchases of banks by industrial
companies are opposed by many who argue that such measures would
threaten independent banks and the smaller businesses and farmers who
depend on such institutions.110 Under this view, the Treasury's plan
would hurt the average consumer by increasing concentration, by mak-
ing the financial marketplace less competitive, and by posing severe risks
for the taxpayer by extending the federal safety net. Finally, the plan
simply would lead to corporate reshuffling, not to new marketplace
entries. 11
To the extent that they are right about industry consolidation, the crit-
ics may prove too much. Allowing the affiliation of banks with nonbanks
may be important not because it creates new and efficient business ar-
rangements that benefit consumers and industry, but because the result-
ing mergers, acquisitions, and asset sales would replace what might
otherwise be bank failures, securities firm bankruptcies, and insurance
company seizures. Thus, what is hailed as a long-term solution may in
fact be most beneficial as a "quick fix" for an ailing financial services
109. Id. at 25.
110. Small Banks Intensify Assault On Reform Plan, AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 6, 1991, at 1.
Thus, the IBAA has labeled the Treasury proposal "a blueprint for massive economic concentra-
tion." Hearings on Restructuring of the Banking Industry, supra note 104 (testimony of David
Ballweg, at 4-5).
111. Id. at 21-22.
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industry. Securities and insurance firms will buy banks for their profit
potential and for their market penetration with financial services con-
sumers-both business and personal-that will then allow the nonbank
firms to recover some of the market they have lost.
112
Finally, the Treasury proposal is criticized because the potential bene-
fits that might grow out of combining banking and nonbanking entities
are seen as remote at best and illusory at worst. Yet the potential detri-
ments are immediate. The synergies of any conglomerate structure,
while theoretically obtainable, often prove elusive. This problem can
only grow worse when combined with regulatory firewalls.
2. Financial Activities of Banks
Even though current law prohibites banks from affiliating with securi-
ties firms and from otherwise engaging in activities such as underwriting
and dealing in securities, a number of securities-related activities are al-
lowed. The Treasury recommendations regarding securities activities of
banks change the rules such that, with the exception of nine specified
activities, currently allowed activities may be continued, but outside the
bank."' Banks would be required to establish separate affiliates or sub-
sidiaries to perform these nine excepted activities. 1 4 Under the FSHC
structure, these activities could be conducted through a subsidiary of the
bank, through an affiiated securities subsidiary of the FSHC, or through
a nonbank affiliate of the DHC. Certain securities, including shares or
debt issued by the bank or by any affiliate, would not be allowed to be
sold or offered for sale to the general public in any part of the bank com-
monly accessible to the general public for the purpose of accepting
deposits. 115
In addition, FISCCA would amend the Securities Act of 1933 to re-
quire registration of all public offerings of bank-issued or bank-guaran-
teed securities." 6 Disclosure with respect to such securities therefore
112. Various bankers have praised the Treasury's proposed reforms because they would lead to
banking mergers and shrink the industry to a safer size. Continental Bank Corp. Vice Chairman
Richard Huber stated that "[p]recipitating mergers is the intent of the plan," and that "[a]nything
that hastens the consolidation of our industry will help it." John Rau, Chief Executive Officer of
LaSalle National Bank, observed that "[t]he new securities powers would help the big New York
banks more.... For the top 50 U.S. banks, this is very important for their evolution." Reuters, Feb.
6, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file).
113. FISCCA § 242(a)-(c).
114. Id. § 242(d).
115. Id. § 242(e).




would be regulated by the SEC instead of the banking regulatory agen-
cies. This type of "functional regulation" is intended to be more efficient
and effective than a system in which multiple agencies each regulate es-
sentially the same activity.117
FISCCA provisions related to insurance activities of banks are mini-
mal and generally clarify rather than reform existing law. Essentially,
FISCCA would allow banks to (i) sell insurance from the bank's offices
in towns with populations of fewer than 5,000, to residents of and per-
sons employed in the state in which such towns are located, and (ii) en-
gage in insurance brokerage in any state in which the bank has its
headquarters or a branch, to the extent the insurance brokerage activities
are permitted in that state for state-chartered banks.118
3. Nationwide Banking and Branching
There are three basic parts to the Treasury Proposal regarding nation-
wide banking and branching.1 9 First, national banks immediately would
be allowed to branch into any state that currently allows interstate bank-
ing (i.e., that allows bank holding companies from other states to acquire
banks within its borders). Second, each state would decide whether to
grant interstate branching authority to its state-chartered banks, but
could not limit the ability of an out-of-state bank to branch inside its
borders to the same extent its own banks can branch, unless it currently
prohibits interstate banking absolutely. Third, in three years, FSHCs or
DHCs could acquire banks in any state, including those states that cur-
rently prohibit interstate banking (states would then be required to allow
interstate branching as discussed above).
By amending Section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 2 '
FISCCA would authorize the appropriate federal banking regulator to
approve the application of any DHC, FSHC, or foreign bank to acquire,
directly or indirectly, any voting shares of, interest in, or all or substan-
tially all of the assets of, any additional insured depositary institution or
FSHC located in any state. 2' The amendment effectively repeals the
Douglas Amendment, which prohibits a bank holding company from ac-
117. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at 59.
118. FISCCA § 222.
119. Nationwide banking would allow a FSHC to have separate banks in every state; interstate
or nationwide branching would allow a single bank to operate branches in every state.
120. Redesignated as § 3(f) of the proposed Financial Services Holding Company Act, set forth
in FISCCA, Title IV.
121. FISCCA § 261.
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quiring a bank in a state other than the company's principal state of busi-
ness, unless the acquisition is specifically authorized by the laws of the
state in which the bank is located. 122
Unlike several other provisions in FISCCA that would dramatically
change existing banking law,12 the authorization of nationwide banking
through a holding company structure merely would bring to a conclusion
the ever-increasing trend by states to allow interstate banking within
their borders.12 4 By 1991, thirty-three states permitted acquisitions of
banks within their states by bank holding companies from other states.
Thirteen others and the District of Columbia allow interstate banking
based on reciprocity. Only Hawaii, Kansas, Montana, and North Da-
kota prohibit all interstate banking.
Nonetheless, opposition to the Treasury proposal generally follows
two lines. First, nation-wide banking, when combined with interstate
branching, would "lead to massive consolidation of the banking industry
to the detriment of the consumer, small businesses, farmers, and ulti-
mately the taxpayer."' 125 Second, while nation-wide banking in principle
may produce some efficiency and safety benefits, the "laboratory of the
states" is still in the process of developing an interstate banking system
that strikes a good balance between the local interests and the need for
greater economies of scale and efficiency through diversification.'
2 6
The Treasury Report makes a fair assesment of the effects of nation-
wide banking on the industry, consumers, and taxpayers. Equally impor-
tant may be the limited nature of these effects. Well-run, locally
supported banks will not suddenly branch nationwide, nor will they be
run out of business by interstate conglomerates.
The evidence clearly shows that both big and small, diversified and special-
ized financial firms compete side-by-side in markets where they are permit-
ted to do so. Community banks in New York, California and Washington
have prospered by competing with big banks such as Citibank, Chemical,
Security Pacific and Bank of America. There are shopping malls in virtu-
ally every city and town in this country where small shops and boutiques
122. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at XVII-2.
123. See, eg., FISCCA § 251 (establishing a new "zone" system for regulating a bank's activi-
ties and for determining the corrective action to be ordered by regulators); FISCCA § 101 (eliminat-
ing insurance coverage for brokered deposits). See also supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text
and infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
124. Treasury Report, supra note 2, at XVII-8.






compete side-by-side with major department stores. This is likely to be the
case in financial services as well.1 2
7
4. Capital-Based Ownership, Activities, and Supervision
Under the Treasury proposal, capital would play a central role in de-
termining whether a bank could take advantage of financial services
modernization. The level of a bank's capital would determine whether it
could become and remain part of a FSHC, and thus engage in securities,
insurance, and other activities of a financial nature. In addition, as a
bank's capital declined, the bank, its FSHC, and its DHC would be sub-
ject to increasingly heightened supervisory action including, in some in-
stances, forced divesture. In this way, the "proposal would make bank
supervision more effective by creating incentives for banks to build and
maintain high levels of capital, and providing swifter and more certain
regulatory intervention against banks with too little capital."'12
a. Capital Measurement and the Zone System
In general, the relevant capital measures for purposes of FISCCA in-
clude a risk-based capital ratio and a leverage limit, the numerical con-
tent of which is to be determined by the appropriate federal banking
agency, and any other capital measure established as relevant by such
agency.129 In addition, the appropriate federal banking agency is to de-
termine what constitutes "Tier 1" or core capital. Based upon their capi-
tal levels, banks would then be classified in one of five "Zones:"
(i) Zone 1 would include any insured bank that (A) maintains a
risk-based capital ratio and Tier 1 capital that are both significantly
in excess of the required minimum, or (B) maintains a risk-based
capital ratio that meets the minimum and Tier 1 capital that is sub-
stantially in excess of the minimum. A Zone 1 bank also would be
required to maintain capital that meets or exceeds the minimum ra-
tio for each other relevant capital measure established by the appro-
priate federal banking agency.
(ii) Zone 2 would include any bank with capital that meets or
127. Hearings on Restructuring of the Banking Industry, supra note 104 (testimony of Philip J.
Purcell, at 20).
128. Restructuring of the Financial Services Insustry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on Re-
structuring the Financial Services Industry] (testimony of Nicholas Brady, Secretary of the Treasury,
at 12).
129. FISCCA § 251.
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exceeds the required minimum ratio for each relevant capital mea-
sure but that is not within Zone 1.
(ii) Zone 3 would include any bank that maintains capital that is
below the required minimum ratio for any relevant capital measure,
but that is not within Zone 4 or Zone 5.
(iv) Zone 4 would include any bank that maintains capital that is
significantly below the required minimum for any relevant capital
measure, but is not within Zone 5, or that is reclassified to Zone 4
upon the determination by the appropriate federal banking agency
that the bank is in an unsafe and unsound condition. 130
(v) Zone 5 would include any bank that maintains capital at or
below the applicable "critical capital level," which is to be "a level
of capital that will, as a general matter, permit resolution of an in-
sured bank's problems without significant financial loss" to the bank
insurance fund, but must at least equal or exceed a ratio of Tier 1
capital to total assets of one and one-half percent. 131
b. Rewards for Well-Capitalized Banks
The primary rewards for well-capitalized banks are that the bank itself
could engage in certain newly authorized financial activities and take ad-
vantage of an expedited approval process for opening new branches and
acquiring bank affiliates. Additionally, the bank could be owned by a
FSHC. The premise of the entire structure of allowing banks to be
owned by FSHCs that also own insurance companies, securities firms,
and other entities engaged in financial activities and FSHCs to be owned
by commercial firms is that banks maintain or make significant progress
toward obtaining Zone 1 status.13 2 Under FISCCA, if eighty percent of
the assets of the banks that an FSHC owns are in Zone 1 and the remain-
ing twenty percent are in Zone 2, the FSHC would be deemed a Zone 1
FSHC and therefore would be authorized to engage, through non-bank
subsidiaries, in securities, insurance and other activities-"new financial
130. The term "significantly" is not defined with respect to Zone 4 or Zone 1, but "is not in-
tended to suggest symmetry with Zone 1 . . ." FISCCA, Section by Section Analysis, as prepared by
the Treasury, at 58.
131. FISCCA § 251, amending Federal Deposit Insurance Act, ch. 967, § 2[l], 64 Stat. 873
(1950) by adding new § 35(b)(6).
132. Reform of the Federal Deposit Insurance System: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. - (1991) [hereinafter Hearings on
Reform of the Federal Deposit Insurance System] (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chariman, Board of




activities"-deemed by the appropriate federal agency to be of a financial
nature.
In addition, a FSHC that makes substantial progress (as determined by
the relevant federal regulator) toward Zone 1 status also may engage in
new financial activities. In this regard, a DHC could acquire a Zone 2
FSHC, but only if, as a result of the acquisition, the FSHC would be
reclassified in Zone 1 due to an increase in capital. Approval for acquisi-
tions of banks and for commencement of new financial activities by Zone
1 FSHCs would be expedited as well, and an agency could only disap-
prove an application by a Zone 1 FSHC or its DHC to engage in new
financial activities if the holding company were in an unsafe and unsound
condition or were engaging in any unsafe and unsound practice.
c. Prompt Corrective Action
Section 251 of FISCCA would add a new Section 35 to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, authorizing certain mandatory and discretionary
supervisory actions by the appropriate federal banking agency with re-
spect to an insured bank. Banks with capital in Zones 2 through 5, and,
in certain instances, their FSHCs and DHCs, would be covered by the
additional regulations. 133 These new "prompt corrective actions" de-
pend primarily, but not entirely, on capital levels. The appropriate fed-
eral agency also would have explicit authority to reclassify institutions
into lower Zones, and thereby to force additional capital contributions or
divestiture of affiliates, based solely on the "safety and soundness" of a
bank, apart from its capital level.
Supervisory powers with respect to Zone 1 banks and their FSHCs and
DHCs are generally limited. They include: (i) Receiving notice after the
commencement of certain permitted activities, the opening of other than
the first branch in a state, or the merger or consolidation with another
bank; (ii) disapproving transactions when the condition of the bank or its
activities are unsafe and unsound or when, as a result of the transaction,
the bank would be reclassified to a lower Zone; and (iii) requiring either
capital restoration or divestiture of the bank or the non-bank affiliates.
Supervisory powers over Zone 2 institutions generally include, in addi-
tion to the Zone 1 powers, (i) mandatory disapproval of any investment,
expansion, acquisition, or other proposal if the condition of a bank or its
holding company, or their activities, are unsafe and sound; and (ii)
133. FISCCA § 251.
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mandatory restriction of capital distributions that would cause a reclas-
sification to a lower Zone.
More extensive mandatory supervision would be required over Zone 3
banks, including: (i) Mandatory submission and implementation of a
capital restoration plan; (ii) restrictions on capital distributions and pay-
ments to affiliates; (iii) disapproval of any investment, expansion, acquisi-
tion, or similar action by a bank, its FSHC or its subsidiaries; (iv)
retention of consolidated capital of the bank, the FSHC, and the DHC at
least equal to the minimum required for the bank, and dissallowance of
any capital distribution; and (v) mandatory supervision of the FSHC, the
DHC, and each subsidiary of the FSHC as if each individually were a
Zone 3 bank. In addition, the appropriate federal banking agency would
have discretionary authority to: (i) restrict or eliminate the growth of, or
order the reduction of, bank assets or liabilities; (ii) terminate, reduce, or
alter any activity if it creates excessive risk to the bank; (ii) require dis-
missal of certain officers and employees and reduce or eliminate some
forms of compensation; (iv) order election of a new board of directors
designated by the agency; and (v) require divestiture of any affiliate in
danger of default that poses significant risk to the liquidity or solvency of
the bank or is likely to cause significant dissipation of the bank' assets or
earnings.
Required supervisory actions with respect to Zone 4 banks and their
FSHCs and DHCs, include: (i) Manadatory submission of a capital res-
toration plan; (ii) supervision of the FSHC and the DHC on the same
terms and by the same means as the bank, including examination; and
(iii) restriction of compensation to certain executive officers. Discretion-
ary supervisory actions include: (i) Zone 3 actions; (ii) restriction of any
transaction between the bank and any other affiliate; (iii) divestiture, liq-
uidation, or closing of any nonbank affiliate in danger of default; (iv)
divestiture of the bank; (v) dismissal of certain officers and employees
and restriction of compensation; and (vi) appointment of a conservator
for the bank.
With respect to Zone 5 banks and their FSHCs and DHCs, the appro-
priate federal banking agency must require sale or merger of the bank or
appoint a receiver or conservator within thirty days of the date on which
the bank's capital reaches the "critical capital level" and the bank is clas-




d. Effect of the Treasury Proposal
By allowing only well-capitalized banks to engage in new financial ac-
tivities through FSHCs, the Treasury proposal attempts to provide incen-
tives for new capital to flow to the banking industry, while at the same
time providing a cushion for any added risks not adequately isolated
from the bank by firewalls. 34 "Not only does such an approach create
additional inducements for these organizations to build and maintain the
banks' capital, it also addresses one of the most significant causes of
weaknesses in the banking system by widening the scope of activities for
holding companies with well capitalized bank subsidiaries."' 1 35
Moreover, establishing a supervisory system around capital-based
prompt corrective action has won praise because it "would permit a sys-
tematic program of progressive restraint based on the capital of the insti-
tution, instead of requiring the regulator to determine on a case-by-case
basis, as a precondition for remedial action, that an unsafe and unsound
practice exists."136 Thus, while there is much opposition to the proposal
that banks be allowed to expand into new financial activities, requiring
such banks to have higher capital as a prerequisite is generally well-
supported.
There remain, however, a number of concerns regarding the role of
capital in the Treasury proposal. Primary among these is the fear that,
although regulators can take action against any unsafe and unsound ac-
tivity or condition, capital alone will become an exclusive measure, at
least with regard to well-capitalized banks. Despite the Treasury Re-
port's claim that the "single most powerful tool to make banks safer is
capital," it is generally recognized that capital levels are a lagging indica-
tor of financial strength. 13 7 It may be difficult to take prompt corrective
action against an apparently well-capitalized bank. "If depletion of capi-
tal is to be avoided, instead of merely corrected, supervisors must have
134. Frederick L. Webber, President and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. League of Savings
Institutions, supports this measure. "Rewarding well-capitalized institutions clearly makes sense.
Foremost among its virtues is the incentive it provides to build capital. That certainly merits the
support of all savings institutions." Savings Institutions Have Much at Stake in the Debate Over
Treasury's Reform Plan, AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 22, 1991, at 4.
135. Hearings on Reform ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance System, supra note 132 (testimony of
Alan Greenspan, at 19).
136. Id. (testimony of Alan Greenspan, at 6).
137. Id. (testimony of L. William Seidman, Chariman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
at 32). See also Hearings on Restructuring the Financial Services Industry, supra note 128 (testimony
of Charles A. Bowsher, Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, at 8).
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the ability to take early action to correct poor loan and investment poli-
cies, poor internal controls, vulnerable earnings, excessive interest-rate
risk, unqualified management, etc."13  The General Accounting Office
has proposed that the critical capital concept be replaced with a "trip
wire" system, which would require prompt regulatory action tied to spe-
cific unsafe banking practices. "Under this approach to supervision and
enforcement, regulatory discretion in dealing with identified problems
would be limited, and owners and managers of insured banking institu-
tions would know in advance the consequences of actions that could po-
tentially weaken the financial strength of their institutions." 13 9
The U.S. League of Savings Institutions also has raised questions
about the Treasury's plan to set in stone a critical capital threshold below
which the regulators would be required to seize an institution, arguing
that one of the problems with such an inflexible approach is that the
definition of capital constantly evolves. What is an appropriate threshold
at one time might not be so at a later time, when legislative relief may not
be possible in a timely manner.
[W]hile early intervention is intended to minimize taxpayer exposure and
expense, it could have the opposite consequence in some cases. In short,
there can be instances (and we have some actual cases in mind) where,
although an institution has fallen to low net worth levels, it could be more
beneficial to the taxpayer to allow it to work its way back into
compliance.140
The American Bankers Association (ABA) has expressed a similar
concern over the "critical" capital level concept used in the Treasury
proposal. The ABA is concerned that for the "critical" capital level to be
high enough to assure that the FDIC will experience only insignificant
losses, it would have to be almost as high as the FDIC's loss rate on case
resolutions. For example, if the FDIC's loss rate is approximately twelve
percent on average, the critical capital would have to be approximately
nine percent.14 1 Chairman Greenspan has voiced similar concerns and
has suggested that the basis for early intervention should be to "mini-
mize" resolution costs rather than resolution "without significant finan-
138. Hearngs on Restructuring of the Financial Services Industry, supra note 128, (testimony of
L. William Seidman, at 32).
139. Id. (testimony of Charles A. Bowsher, at 10).
140. Hearings on Restructuring of the Banking Industry, supra note 104 (testimony of Donald B,
Shackelford, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, State Savings Bank, Columbus, Ohio, and
Chairman, U.S. League of Savings Institutions, at 19).




cial loss to the FDIC."'142
With respect to basing supervisory action primarily on a bank's capi-
tal, the Treasury proposal leaves the determination of capital standards
entirely to the regulators. While proper in many respects, this could lead
to a constantly changing regulatory environment. "The definition of the
zones will change from time to time as regulatory attitudes change. In-
stitutions will change zones as the economy changes and as the regula-
tors change their rules. When an institution changes zones, its whole
regulatory environment will change."' 143
In addition, there is some concern that the discretionary authority of
regulators under FISCCA may be too powerful and "that the regulatory
actions that are described as discretionary will soon become mandatory,
as regulators competing to see who can be the toughest will quickly be
compelled to impose as many of the discretionary sanctions as possi-
ble."'" The discretionary approach, however, is strongly supported by
the regulators. For instance, Chairman Greenspan has forcefully argued
for even greater regulatory authority to intervene than that recom-
mended by the Treasury proposal. 145
Another concern is that FISCCA would subject Zone 3 FSHCs to con-
solidated capital requirements unless they recapitalize or divest the low-
capital bank. However, "[fjorced divestiture may not be a very effective
way to police capital, particularly during economic downturns when it
may be hard to sell assets."'" Similarly, requiring a holding company to
be a "source of strength" for the capital needs of a bank, even though the
142. Hearings on Reform of the Federal Deposit Insurance System, supra note 132 (testimony of
Alan Greenspan, at 8). He cautions, however, that "prompt corrective action will tend to reduce
losses to the insurance fund, but a genuine fail-safe, no-losses-to-the-FDIC policy would require
unrealistically high capital levels." Id. at 8-9.
143. Hearings on Restructuring of the Banking Industry, supra note 104 (testimony on Donald B.
Shackelford, at 9).
144. Id. (testimony of Edward P. Lorenson, Chairman and President, Bristol Savings Bank, on
behalf of the National Council of Savings Institutions, at 12-14).
145. Hearings on Reform ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance System, supra note 132 (testimony of
Alan Greenspan, at 5-6) ("We believe more general language-such as 'other supervisory criteria'
[rather than just "unsafe and unsound"]-would be more useful. Operationally, this would mean
that supervisors would be able also to consider asset quality, liquidity, earnings, risk concentrations,
and judgmental information based on recent examinations, such as classified assets data").
146. Id. (testimony of L. William Seidman, at 10). "[W]e do not want to handicap the banks
that are moving 'in the middle of the pack' in terms of their competitive position when compared
with better capitalized competitors. If the products and services allowed to better-capitalized institu-
tions give them a competitive advantage, the less well-capitalized institutions may be pushed into
weaker and weaker positions. Banks that are further behind in capital levels will never catch up if
they are not allowed to compete." Id. at 34.
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holding company is not engaged in new financial activities, may make
investments in "traditional" banks unattractive. 47 On an operating level,
banks may raise their capital ratios not by increasing equity but by re-
ducing assets, that is, by restricting loans.1 48
Moreover, banks with Zone 3 capital on the effective date of the re-
quirement could not be acquired by an FSHC unless the acquiror pro-
vided enough capital to move the bank to Zone 1, likely a very large
capital infusion. The very banks that could benefit the most from addi-
tional capital would be competing with better-capitalized FSHCs and
DHCs that are able to offer much more diversified and (presumably)
profitable investment. A better approach may be to allow a Zone 3
FSHC a period of time to reach an increased capital level while phasing
in the authority to engage in new financial activities.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The recommendations set forth in the Treasury Report and in
FISCCA would affect all major segments of the financial services indus-
try. The Treasury Report is a detailed, scholarly analysis of the issues.
However, as any observer of Congress knows, major legislation is en-
acted for a variety of reasons, the merits of the proposals representing
only one consideration. Therefore, the Treasury's theoretical analysis
may not be as important a factor as local political concerns in determin-
ing whether the recommendations become law. Whether or not its far-
reaching proposals are ultimately adopted, or, if adopted, whether they
would be a cure for problem banks, the Treasury Report has at least
served to focus debate and force serious consideration of legislative meas-
ures to address the major problems facing the banking industry today.
147. "Many bank stocks prior to the mid-1930s were subject to additional assessments ifa bank
experienced financial difficulties. Congress and the state legislatures removed these requirements
because of their negative effect on the ability of banks to raise new capital." Id. at 10.
148. Thomas Hawly, of Salomon Brothers, Inc., has criticized the Treasury Report's emphasis
on the need for banks to be strongly capitalized. "That part of the Treasury plan will immediately
affect the mind sets of bank managements and be passed on rather quickly to borrowers in the form
of no loans. As the proposal is written now, it definitely intensifies the credit crunch." Reuters,
Money Report, Feb. 6, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file).
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